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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the mid-1990s Mr. John Bushnell went through a difficult divorce. As a result

of that difficult divorce, Mr. Bushnell fell behind on paying his taxes and filing his tax
returns. In January 2005, after putting his life back together, Mr. Bushnell assembled
adequate funds to satisfy his tax debt and desired to become current with the IRS.1 He
began by organizing his documents and contacting the IRS to prepare and file prior year
tax returns from 1997 through 2003. (R.436 at 493). Mr. Bushnell hired a bookkeeper,
Denise Naylor, to organize his receipts, bank statements, copies of checks, and other
financial documents. (Id.; R. 437 at 611). At Mr. Bushnell‟s request, the IRS sent to him
records relating to his tax returns for the years 1997 through 2003. Once Mr. Bushnell
had the information from the IRS, and his documents had been organized and placed into
the software program Quicken, he sought a certified public accountant (“CPA”) to
prepare the returns and perhaps negotiate with the IRS. Mr. Bushnell turned to Dale K.
Barker, P.C (hereinafter “Barker”) to complete those final tasks. Mr. Dale K. Barker, Jr.
(hereinafter “Mr. Barker”) of Dale K. Barker, P.C. met with Mr. Bushnell, and Ms.
Naylor. After listening to what needed to be done, Mr. Barker stated to Mr. Bushnell and

Mr. Barker states that “Defendant John Bushnell is a tax cheat.” (Appellant Br. at X).
Barker‟s claim is a blatant attempt to malign Mr. Bushnell‟s reputation before this Court.
The evidence undermines Mr. Barker‟s contention and reveals his intention to damage
Mr. Bushnell‟s credibility before the Court. Mr. Barker sent a letter to the IRS on
December 7, 2005 stating “[t]here was no wanton disregard for the law by [Mr.
Bushnell]. . . Given the situation, may we humble (sic) and respectfully request an
abatement of the Failure to File and the Failure to Pay penalties…” Mr. Barker -- now
feeling that Mr. Bushnell‟s good intentions may damage its case -- is attempting to
damage Mr. Bushnell‟s credibility before the Court. Mr. Bushnell is current with the IRS
in all of his filings and all of his taxes are completely paid in full.
1
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Ms. Naylor that he was an expert at dealing with the IRS and estimated that it would cost
approximately $15,000 to prepare and file the past tax returns and negotiate with the IRS.
(R.436 at 498-99; R437 at 614). Even though the estimate seemed high to prepare seven
tax returns, Mr. Bushnell decided that he needed to hire someone who was as experienced
as Mr. Barker represented himself to be. (R.436 at 499-500). Unfortunately, Mr.
Bushnell‟s reliance upon the expertise of Barker would prove misplaced, as Barker would
create much more work than was needed, would pick fights with the IRS agents, would
miss deadlines agreed upon with the IRS Agents, and would charge Mr. Bushnell over
$51,675.20 for the work he requested. After a year of unnecessary delays, fights with the
IRS, and over-billing, Mr. Bushnell found a new CPA and hired an attorney to dispute
Barker‟s bill. After a few failed settlement attempts with Barker, Plaintiff/Appellant Dale
K. Barker, P.C. initiated this action by filing a Complaint against Defendants/Appellees
John Bushnell (“Bushnell”) and Bushnet, P.C. (“Bushnett”) for breach of contract.
Defendant/Appellee John Bushnell brought a Counter-Claim against Barker for breach of
contract and a Third-Party Complaint against Mr. Barker personally for breach of
contract and malpractice. At the close of Mr. Bushnell‟s evidence supporting his ThirdParty Complaint against Mr. Barker, Mr. Barker moved pursuant to rule 50(a)2 for the

Plaintiff sought to discharge Mr. Bushnell‟s cause of action for breach of contract
through Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). Rule 50(a) allows a party to move for
directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent. Generally, a rule
50(a) is reserved for only a jury trial since the motion contemplates the court to direct the
jury to return a verdict for a party. Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App.
1999). However, a motion brought under rule 50(a) in a bench trial is considered under
rule 41(b). Id. Rule 41(b) states that “[a]fter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without
2
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Court to grant a directed verdict in his favor on Mr. Bushnell‟s third-party actions for
breach of contract and professional negligence. Mr. Barker argued that he was not a
party to the contract, that the Third-Party Compliant was based in a theory of alter ego,
and Mr. Bushnell had not provided enough evidence to pierce the corporate veil. The
Court granted Mr. Barker‟s motion, finding that both the breach of contract action and the
professional negligence action were based upon the theory of alter ego action and Mr.
Bushnell had not provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to pierce the
corporate veil. Mr. Barker motioned the trial court for the attorney fees he incurred in
defending the Third-Party Complaint; however, the Court denied his motion – stating that
since he was not a party to the contract he was not entitled to his attorney fees under
contract‟s attorney fee provision.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS REVIEW
The Trial Court found the following facts after the close of trial. (R. 460 -65)
1.

In the Spring of 2005, Mr. Bushnell had not filed tax returns from 1997

through 2003, nor had he paid taxes for the years 1995 through 2003.
2.

Dale K. Barker, P.C. is an accounting firm located in Salt Lake City, Utah.

3.

Dale K. Barker, Jr. (“Dale Barker”) is a certified public accountant.

4.

In April 2005, Mr. Bushnell met with Dale Barker of Dale K. Barker, P.C.

to discuss Mr. Bushnell‟s and Bushnet‟s tax returns for 1997 through 2003, and the
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff shown no right to
relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence.” Id.has
5

money he owed to the IRS for the years 1995 through 2003. At that time Mr. Bushnell
promptly paid penalties and interest for his 1995 and 1996 filed returns
5.

In that meeting, Mr. Barker told Mr. Bushnell that he was an expert at

dealing with situations such as this and in negotiating with the IRS.
6.

Dale K. Barker, P.C. and John Bushnell entered into a Services Agreement

on or about April 28, 2005, wherein “Barker agree[d] to perform…[a]ll requested
services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker either express, written, or/and
implied.”
7.

Mr. Bushnell brought a Third-Party Complaint against Mr. Baker alleging

that Mr. Barker was liable for breaches under the contract entered into between Mr.
Bushnell and Barker.
8.

At the close of Mr. Bushnell‟s case against Mr. Barker, the Court dismissed

the Third-Party Complaint pursuant to rule 41(b) finding that the facts and the law did not
give Mr. Bushnell relief against Mr. Barker because it was not shown that Mr. Barker
was a party to the contract, and Mr. Bushnell did not provide sufficient evidence to pierce
the corporate veil. (R. 437 at 646, 701-02, 705).
9.

Mr. Barker moved the trial court for his attorney fees under the attorney

fees provision of the contract. (R. 238). The trial court denied Mr. Barker‟s motion for
attorney fees, finding that Mr. Barker was not entitled to attorney fees under the attorney
fee provision of the contract since Mr. Barker was not a party to the contract. (R. 575).
///
///
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III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Mr. Barker raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in

finding that Mr. Barker was not entitled to attorney fees under the contract (Appellant Br.
at 1), (2) whether the trial court erred in finding to award cost to Mr. Bushnell under rule
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (3) whether the trial court committed
legal error when it denied Mr. Barker‟s rule 59 motion3.
As to the first issue, the trial court properly found that Mr. Barker was not entitled
to attorney fees after prevailing in his defense against the Third-Party Complaint, wherein
it was found that Mr. Barker was not a party to the contract. Due to the fact that the trial
court found that Mr. Barker was not a party to the contract, he did not have a right to
attorney fees under the contract‟s attorney fee provision.
As to the second issue, the trial court did not fail to award fees to Mr. Barker
under rule 54(d)(1). As the prevailing party, Mr. Barker was entitled costs under rule
54(d)(1) unless the court found otherwise. Id. The trial court did not find that Mr.
Barker was not entitled to its costs. (R. 575). However, when counsel for Mr. Turner
prepared the judgment on the Third-Party Complaint, he included languages stating “the
third-party complaint is dismissed with prejudice each party to bear its own costs and
attorney fees.” Counsel for Mr. Bushnell approved the form of the order, and the trial

3

Mr. Barker states that there are only two issues presented by the appeal, however, in his
appellate brief, Mr. Barker argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying Mr. Barker‟s
request for attorney fees (Appellant Br. at 4-5), (2) the trial court erred in failing to award
Mr. Barker costs as the prevailing party (Appellant Br. at 5), and (3) the trial court
committed plain error when it failed to grant Mr. Barker‟s Rule 59 motion (Appellant Br.
at 6).
7

court entered order prepared by Mr. Barker. Therefore, Mr. Barker waived his right to
attorney fees when he voluntarily included the language that each party was to bear its
own costs and attorney fees.
As to the third issue, the trial court did not err in denying the motion Mr. Barker
brought under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In Mr. Barker‟s rule 59
motion, he asked the trial court to correct the legal error of not awarding Mr. Barker fees.
The court had not made a determination of law on the issue of costs and therefore there
was no ruling by the trial court which it could affirm or correct.
IV.

MR. BARKER IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AS THE
PREVAILING PARTY
The trial court‟s determination that Mr. Barker is not entitled to attorney fees as

the prevailing party under the third-party action is a legal finding that is reviewed for
correctness. IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 59899 (Utah 2008).
A. A Prevailing Party is Only Entitled to Attorney Fees when Provided by
Contract or Statute
A prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees in a case when they are provided for
by contract or by statute. Stewart v. Utah Public Service Comm‟n, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah
1994); Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
1. Mr. Barker is not Entitled to Attorney Fees Under the Contract.
Mr. Bushnell brought a third-party action against Mr. Barker for breach of
contract. The contract upon which Mr. Bushnell brought his action includes an attorney
8

fee provision which states: “In the event of a breach of this Agreement, the nondefaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and attorneys‟ fees incurred in enforcing this
Agreement or in seeking any other remedy.” Mr. Barker argued at trial that he was not
liable under Mr. Bushnell‟s third-party action for breach of contract because he was not
party to the contract upon which Mr. Bushnell based his action. The trial court found that
Mr. Bushnell had not shown evidence to show Mr. Barker was a party to the contract and
therefore the trial court dismissed Mr. Bushnell‟s claim against Mr. Barker for breach of
contract. Due to the fact that Mr. Barker is not a party to the contract which contains the
attorney fee provision, Mr. Barker is not entitled to receive attorney fees.
2. Mr. Barker is not Entitled to Attorney Fees Under Statute
Due to the fact that Mr. Barker is not entitled to attorney fees under the contract,
he may only be entitled to attorney fees if it is provided by statute. The Utah Code does
not contain a statute that allows for a prevailing party to a general breach of contract
action to obtain their attorney fees. However, the Utah Code does include a statute which
allows for reciprocal attorney fees to either party to a contract that prevails in a civil
action based upon said contract. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008).
Although Mr. Barker is not a party to the contract under which Mr. Bushnell
brought his cause of action, Mr. Barker argues that he is entitled to attorney fees under
the “reciprocal attorney fees statute. (Apellant Br. at 6)4. Mr. Barker argues that under
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 he is entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending
4

Mr. Barker cites to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, however, the legislature renumbered
section 78 during the 2008 general session. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 is now located
in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.
9

against a claim based upon a contract that entitled one of the parties, Mr. Bushnell, to
attorney fees. (Appellant Br. at 6-7). Mr. Barker‟s argument fails because Mr. Barker
was found to have not been a party to the contract.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 only applies to parties to a contract. This issue was
dealt with by the Utah Court of Appeals in Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining,
Inc., 37 P.3d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). In the Anglin case, the Utah Court of Appeals
looked carefully at the language of the reciprocal attorney fees statute to determine
whether the statute provides that a prevailing third-party in an action based upon a
promissory note can be awarded attorney fees if that third-party was not a party to the
promissory note. Id. at 268. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 states “[a] court may award
costs and attorney‟s fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing . . . when the provisions on the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney‟s fees.” Upon a close review of that language the Court of Appeals found that
“[t]he use of the word „either,‟ which comes directly before and modifies the word
„party,‟ is reasonably read to restrict the meaning of „party‟ to include only the parties to
the original promissory note, not any party to the litigation.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Court further supports its interpretation by reasoning that the reason for the
statute was to only create a level playing field among the parties to a contract. The Court
states:
Moreover, where a contract provides for attorney fees, they are
awardable only on the terms and to the extent authorized in the
contract. Thus if a contract allows by statute the only one party to
10

recover attorney fees-presumably the drafting party - the other party
to the contract-usually the weaker party - cannot recover attorney fees,
even if it is the prevailing party in litigation arising under the contract.
Section [78B-5-826] specifically addresses this situation by providing
reciprocal rights to attorney fees, thereby creating a level playing field
for all parties to a promissory note.
Id. (citations omitted).
Therefore, because Mr. Barker is not a party to the contract, he is not entitled to
recover attorney fees as a reciprocal beneficiary under Utah Code Ann § 78B-5-826.
The Court of Appeals further clarified the applicability of the Anglin case in
Express Recovery Services, Inc. v. Rice II, 2007 UT App 125. In that case Express
Recovery Services (“ERS”) brought a cause of action against Rice to find him personally
liable on a contract he signed in his capacity as an officer of a corporation. The trial
court found that Mr. Rice was personally liable on the contract, and according to the
contract provisions, awarded attorney fees to ERS. Mr. Rice appealed the case and the
Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, finding that Mr. Rice singed in his representative
capacity of the corporation and was not personally liable under the contract. Express
Recovery Services v. Rice, 125 P.3d, 108 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). After the Court of
Appeals vacated the judgment, Mr. Rice applied for his attorney fees under the reciprocal
attorney fees statue. The trial court denied the application finding that Mr. Rice was not a
party to the contract and therefore could not be entitled to attorney fees. Mr. Rice

5

Counsel for Mr. Bushnell appeared before this Court in the Express Recovery Services
II case for appellant arguing the same position of Mr. Barker, believing that the facts in
the Anglin case were distinguishable from a case where a defendant is sued as if he were
a party to the contract.
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appealed the issue to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed its
decision in the Anglin case, stating:
Rice "would have us construe the statute to mean that any party to the
litigation involving a [contract] may recover attorney fees so long as
one party to the [contract] has the right to recover attorney fees" under
the contract. Id. at ¶10. However, "[t]he statute states clearly that
'either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any [contract]'
may recover attorney fees.
Rice II at 12.
Even though ERS brought Mr. Rice into the action on a theory that he was a party
to the contract, and even though ERS would have been entitled to its attorney fees had it
proved that Mr. Rice was a party to the contract, because Mr. Rice defeated the claim by
proving he was not a party to the contract he had no reciprocal rights under Utah Code
Ann § 78B-5-826. Similarly in this case, because Mr. Barker was not a party to the
contract, he has no reciprocal right to attorney fees under Utah Code Ann § 78B-5-826.
Conversely, had Mr. Barker been found to be a party to the contract, but not liable for a
breach of contract, he would have had a reciprocal right to attorney fees.
3. The Ruling in Bilzanich does not Overturn the Ruling in Anglin
Mr. Barker argues that the Utah Supreme Court impliedly overturned Anglin when
it decided Bilzanich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2007). (Appellant Br. at 7Mr.
Barker‟s reliance on Bilzanich is misplaced6. In Bilzanich, the Supreme Court reviewed
the issue of whether an action based upon a writing that is found to be unenforceable

6

The Bilzanich case was decided six years after the Anglin case, and its decision does not
disrupt the prior decision in Anglin. This is shown by, among other things, its positive
reference to the Anglin case in its text. Bilzanich at 1046.
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provides a reciprocal right to attorney fees to the prevailing party. Id. at 1044-45. The
Supreme Court found that under Utah Code Ann § 78B-5-826 it is immaterial that events
outside of the writing rendered it ineffectual. The prevailing party had a right to attorney
fees because the action was based upon a writing identified in Utah Code Ann § 78B-5826, and the writing provided for attorney fees to one of the parties to the contract. Id. at
1046.
The case before this Court is distinguishable. In Bilzanich, the defendant
prevailed by showing that the promissory note was unenforceable -- he did not prevail by
showing that he was not a party to the contract -- in that case both the plaintiff and the
defendant were parties to the agreement. Since both parties in Bilzanich were parties to
the contract, and the action was based upon a writing, the attorney fee provision was
enforceable, even though one of the other provisions to the contract was found to be
unenforceable. Unlike the prevailing party in Bilzanich, Mr. Barker prevailed in this case
by showing that he was not a party to the contract. Due to the fact that Mr. Barker is a
nonparty to the contract, he does not have a reciprocal right to attorney fees under Utah
Code Ann § 78B-5-826.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD MR.
BARKER COSTS AS THE PREVAILING PARTY
Mr. Barker contends that the trial court erred in failing to award him costs as the

prevailing party. Mr. Barker filed a request for attorney fees and costs on May 7, 2008.
Mr. Bushnell opposed Mr. Barker‟s request for costs on the basis that the costs requested
by Mr. Barker did not relate to the Third-Party Complaint. In its memorandum decision,

13

the trial court only denied Mr. Barker‟s request for attorney fees; the trial court did not
mention the issue of Mr. Barker‟s costs. (R. at 575).
Despite not ruling on the issue of costs, the judgment on the Third-Party
Complaint -- which was prepared by Mr. Barker‟s counsel – included the language “the
third-party complaint is dismissed with prejudice each party to bear its own costs and
attorney fees.” Counsel for Mr. Bushnell approved the draft Judgment as to form and the
Court entered the Judgment on September 19, 2008. Therefore, Mr. Bushnell waived his
right to costs when he voluntarily proposed language that each party would bear their
own costs.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DENYING MR.
BARKER’S RULE 59 MOTION
Mr. Barker brought a motion under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

arguing that the trial court had made various errors in law. Among the errors alleged by
Mr. Barker, he claimed that the trial court had wrongfully denied its application for costs.
The trial court denied Mr. Barker‟s motion and found that the issue of costs was not
properly before it at the time. (R. 599). Mr. Barker argues that the trial court‟s denial of
his rule 59 motion was clear error. (Appellant Br. at 10). A trial court‟s denial of a rule
59(a) motion is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Markham v. Bradley,
173 P.3d 865, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
The trial court was correct that the issue of costs was not properly before it in Mr.
Barker‟s rule 59 motion. Mr. Barker‟s motion under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure argued that the trial court should grant him a new trial, or open the judgment to

14

make new findings because the trial court had made an error in law. Utah R. Civ. P
59(a)(7). However, at the time Mr. Barker brought his rule 59 motion, he had already
waived his right to fees and therefore the trial court could not have made an error of law.
Although the trial court had not made a ruling on whether Mr. Barker was entitled
to his claimed fees, it had signed a Judgment on the third-party action stating that each
side was to bear their own costs. However, the only reason that the trial court signed the
Judgment stating that the each side was to bear their own costs was because Mr. Barker
prepared the Judgment in that fashion. Therefore, the trial court only ruled that Mr.
Barker was not entitled to fees because Mr. Barker voluntarily waived his rights for fees.
Therefore, because the trial court only signed the Judgment causing each side to
bear their only costs and attorney fees after Mr. Barker voluntarily waived his right for
fees, it was not in error for denying Mr. Barker‟s rule 59 motion.
VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court‟s denial of Mr.
Barker‟s request for an award of attorney fees, and should affirm the trial court‟s denial
of Mr. Barker‟s rule 59 motion.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2009.
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